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ESSAY
LAW IN THE SHADOW OF BARGAINING: THE
FEEDBACK EFFECT OF CIVIL SETTLEMENTS
Ben Depoortert
Lawmakers, courts, and legal scholars often express concern that settle-
ment agreements withhold important information from the public. This Es-
say identifies, to the contrary, problematic issues involving the availability of
information on nonrepresentative settlements. The theoretical and empirical
evidence presented in this Essay demonstrates that, despite the widespread use
of nondisclosure agreements, information on settlements is distributed both
inside and outside legal communities; the information reaches actors through
various channels including the oral culture in legal communities, specialized
reporters, professional interest organizations, and media coverage. Moreo-
ver, information on private settlement agreements circulates more widely if
the agreed compensation in a given settlement exceeds the expected value of
the claim at trial. For example, professional organizations highlight novel
settlements that are strategically important to lawyers, and special interest
groups bring attention to extravagant settlements that are most likely to in-
duce legislative action.
The selective availability of information on outlier settlements increases
the potential impact of settlement agreements. For instance, in tort disputes,
individual settlement concessions make it harder for similarly situated de-
fendants to deflect forthcoming claims. Ambitious trial lawyers will use prior
settlements as minimum bargaining thresholds. Plaintiffs in future cases
become more demanding and more reluctant to accept settlements below what
others have agreed to in prior, analogous settlements. Moreover, due to their
noncoercive nature, settlements may frame the normative outlook on particu-
lar claims or disputes. Consequently, settlement trends may become norma-
tive benchmarks to judges and juries that seek to reinforce such valuations in
settlement conferences or trials. The settlement dynamics identified in this
Essay provide a novel inroad for possible research on the evolution of reme-
dies and damages in various areas of law.
t This Essay benefited greatly from comments and suggestions by Jennifer Arlen, Ian
Ayres, Judge Guido Calabresi, Deborah DeMott, Michael Froomkin, Henry Hansmann,
Doug Kysar, Gideon Parchomovsky, Susan Rose-Ackerman, Robert Rosen, Peter Siegelman
and workshop participants at Boston College Law School, Boston University School of Law,
Connecticut University School of Law, Duke Law School, Yale Law School, and the 2009
Annual Meeting of the American Association of Law & Economics. Please contact
bdpoorte@stanford.edu.
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INTRODUCTION
In a system of precedent, verdicts in individual disputes influence
how courts decide future cases. Legal scholars and commentators
thus focus on judicial precedent as a driving force of legal change.'
Settlements receive considerably less attention in the literature.
If considered at all, legal scholarship mostly understands settlements
to influence judicial precedent by keeping certain disputes out of the
courts. For instance, according to the selection effect, the decision to
settle or litigate may influence the path of the law. 2 Repeat players
I See, e.g., Robert Cooter & Lewis Kornhauser, Can Litigation Improve the Law Without
the Help ofJudges?, 9J. LEGAL STUD. 139, 145-50 (1980) (applying mathematical models of
biological evolution to judicial precedent); John C. Goodman, An Economic Theory of the
Evolution of Common Law, 7J. LEGAL STUD. 393, 395-99 (1979) (using probabilistic analysis
to demonstrate that parties will invest more resources to obtain efficient precedent); Gil-
lian K. Hadfield, Bias in the Evolution of Legal Rules, 80 GEO. L.J. 583, 588-94 (1992) (re-
jecting efficiency claims because judges see only biased samples of potential cases); George
L. Priest, The Common Law Process and the Selection of Efficient Rules, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 65, 67
(1977) (noting that inefficient precedents generate larger stakes and are more likely to
invite litigation); Paul H. Rubin, Why is the Common Law Efficient?, 6J. LEGAL STUD. 51, 53
(1977) (explaining how inefficient precedents create asymmetric stakes and are subject to
greater selection pressure). As a result, repeat players invest heavily in obtaining favorable
precedents. See generally Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come out Ahead: Speculation on the
Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAw & Soc'y. REV. 95, 149-50 (1974) (arguing that the disparity in
legal resources plays a critical role in the evolution of the law); Paul H. Rubin & Martin J.
Bailey, The Role of Lawyers in Changing the Law, 23J. LEGAL STUD. 807, 808 (1994) (examin-
ing the influence of legal professionals on the evolution of the law).
2 According to the selection effect, disputes selected for litigation concentrate to-
ward decisions where parties' probability estimates of victory at trial are further away from
the decision standard. This observation resulted in the so-called "50 percent rule," which
holds that cases selected for litigation tend toward a 50 percent success rate. See George L.
Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 17-24
(1984); George L. Priest, Selective Characteristics of Litigation, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 399, 401-02
(1980). For empirical support and research presenting counterevidence, see, for example,
Daniel Kessler, Thomas Meites & Geoffrey Miller, Explaining Deviations from the Fifty-Percent
[Vol. 95:957
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with high stakes will settle disputes if an unfavorable precedent might
result; they litigate only in the hopes of obtaining positive precedents.
As a result, defendants with significant financial stakes in legal dis-
putes come out ahead because of their ability to "purchase" a confi-
dential settlement, avoiding unfavorable judicial precedents.3
These observations follow from two conventional viewpoints on
settlements. First, it is understood that the likely amount that a court
would award at trial determines negotiations. Accordingly, if settle-
ments simply mimic the expected outcomes of disputes at trial, settle-
ments are not relevant as a source of law. Second, it is generally
assumed that, due to nondisclosure agreements, information on set-
tlements is confined to the parties involved in the settlement. If confi-
dentiality reigns supreme, settlements have no important public role
in matters of civil justice.
Although these perspectives on settlements have some merit, they
fall far short of accurately describing the settlement landscape. The
premise of this Essay is that the simplified perspective on settlements,
as described above, has led scholars to overlook the important, hidden
influence that civil settlements have on legal change. Although bar-
gaining occurs in the background of a probable trial outcome, various
extralegal considerations often influence the outcome of negotia-
tions. Due to circumstantial factors-for instance, a party's sensitivity
to the negative public attention that a lawsuit generates-settlements
may occur at terms that may be below, but also quite likely above, the
expected value of a claim at trial. Such novel settlements are of great
interest to legal professionals. The theoretical and empirical evidence
presented in this Essay demonstrates that, despite the widespread use
of nondisclosure agreements, information on such innovative settle-
ments is distributed both inside and outside legal communities, and
reaching actors through various channels, including the oral culture
Rule: A Multimodal Approach to the Selection of Cases for Litigation, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 233, 235
(1996) (confirming that divergent expectation models closely resemble the fifty percent
win rate); Peter Siegelman &JohnJ. Donohue III, The Selection of Employment Discrimination
Disputes for Litigation: Using Business Cycle Effects to Test the Priest-Klein Hypothesis, 24 J. LEGAL
STUD. 427, 430-31 (1996) (providing empirical evidence on the basis of an examination of
win rates in employment discrimination cases filed during recessions); Joel Waldfogel, The
Selection Hypothesis and the Relationship Between Trial and Plaintiff Victory, 103 J. POL. ECON.
229, 229 (1995) (providing "strong evidence for the selection hypothesis in estimated rela-
tionships between trial rates and plaintiff win rates at trial across case types and judges");
Donald Wittman, Is the Selection of Cases for Trial Biased?, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 185, 186-95
(1985) (examining a different model of the distribution of litigation estimates of outcomes
that leads to contrary conclusions about the litigation process).
3 See generally Galanter, supra note 1, at 101-02 (suggesting that repeat players are
more likely to settle cases in which they expect unfavorable outcomes in an effort to avoid
negative precedent).
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in legal communities, specialized reporters, professional interest orga-
nizations, and media coverage. 4
In view of these observations, I argue in this Essay that novel civil
settlements have a feedback effect on the path of the law. First, prior
settlements exert "peer pressure" on similarly situated parties, effec-
tively weakening their position in comparable disputes. Innovative
settlements serve as benchmarks to ambitious lawyers, making plain-
tiffs in future disputes more demanding and thus more reluctant to
accept settlements below those that parties in prior settlements
received.
Second, due to their noncoercive nature, settlements may frame
the normative outlook on particular claims or disputes. A novel legal
claim for tort compensation might be considered outrageous at first,
but will be perceived as less extraordinary if it has been gratified by a
prior concession in a settlement agreement. As a settlement prece-
dent reduces the apparent unreasonableness of any claim, it becomes
harder for similarly situated parties to contest similar claims in future
cases. Judges, for instance, may interpret settlement precedents as ex-
pressive statements regarding the appropriateness of compensation.
Once a novel legal claim for tort compensation has been gratified by a
similar concession in a private settlement agreement, parties will per-
ceive future claims as less extraordinary. Consequently, if a defendant
refuses a settlement proposal that is comparable to concessions made
by other defendants in similar circumstances, this defendant might
receive little sympathy from a judge or jury in subsequent proceed-
ings. Thus, settlement trends may become normative benchmarks for
judges and juries seeking to reinforce such valuations in settlement
conferences or trials.5
Third, as this Essay describes, a selection bias influences the feed-
back effect of settlements. Part II describes, from both a theoretical
and empirical perspective, how information on private settlement
agreements circulates more widely if the agreed compensation in a
given settlement exceeds the expected value of the claim at trial. For
example, media reports focus on spectacular tort awards, professional
organizations highlight novel settlements that are strategically impor-
tant to lawyers, and special interest groups bring attention to extrava-
gant settlements that are most likely to induce legislative action. The
selective availability of information about settlements increases the po-
tential costs of settlement agreements. High-value settlement awards
circulate more broadly and have a disproportionate effect on the per-
ceptions of judges and juries. This reduces the maximum amount
that a defendant will be willing to award in any settlement agreement
4 See infra Part II.
5 See infra Part III.
[Vol. 95:957
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but leaves the minimum settlement demand of the plaintiff unaf-
fected. The likely feedback effect of a prior settlement on future dis-
putes thus increases the defendant's stake in the dispute, possibly
inducing additional litigation.
This Essay makes several contributions to the literature. First, the
feedback effect of settlements complicates the choice between settle-
ment and litigation. In the standard analytical model of litigation, 6
settlements afford litigants the opportunity to avoid the potential costs
of adverse judicial precedents. 7 If settlements have a feedback effect,
as argued below, this reduces the value of settlement as an alternative
to trial. Second, the feedback effect of settlement provides avenues
for further research into the evolution of remedies in several areas of
law. Because information on outlier settlements involving high
awards or novel remedies is distributed more widely, prior settlement
concessions may create sustained pressure towards higher awards and
novel remedies, resulting in a gradual expansion of the legal system.
Third, I document how information on innovative settlements is dis-
tributed both inside and outside legal communities. Settlement infor-
mation is spread inside large law firms, through informal ties among
lawyers and judges, as gossip in local bar associations, and through
strategic disclosures by interest groups. The circulation of informa-
tion on settlement puts into doubt the supposed distinction between
the public sphere of trials and the private, confidential nature of set-
6 The leading economic models on settlements include, for example, RIcHARD A.
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 337-43 (7th ed., 2007); John P. Gould, The Economics
of Legal Conflicts, 2J. LEGAL STUD. 279, 283-91 (1973) (developing an economic model to
measure "[t]he trading behavior of two individuals in the presence of uncertainty" and
applying it in the context of a lawsuit); Keith N. Hylton, Asymmetric Information and the
Selection ofDisputesfor Litigation, 22J. LEGAL STUD. 187, 190 (1993) (presenting a model that
attempts to "extend[ ] the standard litigation model by taking into account informational
constraints and efforts to rationally predict trial outcomes"); William M. Landes, An Eco-
nomic Analysis of the Courts, 14J.L. & ECON. 61, 99 (1971) (examining variables that influ-
ence criminal settlements); Priest & Klein, supra note 2, at 17-24; Steven Shavell, Suit,
Settlement, and Trial: A Theoretical Analysis Under Alternative Methods for the Allocation of Legal
Costs, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 55, 69-73 (1982) (comparing four methods of apportioning litiga-
tion costs and describing how those methods affect parties' litigation decisions).
7 This option is especially likely if parties have asymmetric stakes in the dispute. If
the defendant is a repeat player and the plaintiff is not, the former will be more likely to
offer a premium to the plaintiff in order to bury the dispute in a confidential settlement
agreement. For an economic model, see Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum,
Hush Money, 30 RAND J. ECON. 661, 674-75 (1999) [hereinafter Daughety & Reinganum,
Hush Money] (concluding that a party who is motivated to limit the diffusion of informa-
tion surrounding settlement negotiations loses considerable bargaining power); Andrew F.
Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, Informational Externalities in Settlement Bargaining: Confi-
dentiality and Correlated Culpability, 33 RAND J. ECON. 587, 588 (2002) [hereinafter
Daughety & Reinganum, Informational Externalities] (finding that in cases of correlated lia-
bility, the first plaintiff can free-ride off of future plaintiffs by extracting a premium in
return for secrecy).
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tlements.8 This Essay intends to be a starting point for a renewed dis-
cussion of the role of confidential settlements within the civil justice
system. It deliberately invites and acknowledges the need for future
development and refinement.
This Essay unfolds as follows. Part I briefly reviews the role of
nonlegal factors on the creation of novel settlement outcomes. These
nonlegal factors include the role of lawyers as imperfect agents, the
influence of varying attitudes toward risk, the role of headliner premi-
ums, and collective action problems among defendants. As a result of
these nonlegal determinants of bargaining, settlement outcomes may
depart significantly from the expected value of trial outcomes, creat-
ing novel solutions to legal disputes. Part II illustrates how informa-
tion on innovative settlements becomes disbursed both inside and
outside of legal communities. Part III explores the authority of settle-
ments as a source of informal precedent. I examine how juries,
judges, and lawyers make inferences based upon information regard-
ing novel settlements. Part IV analyzes how the feedback effect of set-
tlements affects litigants' choice between settlement and litigation. I
revise the traditional models on the choice between settlement and
trial in light of the feedback effect of settlements. Part V considers the
virtues and vices of mandatory disclosure statutes given the feedback
effect of settlements. Part VI concludes.
I
SETTLEMENTS OUTSIDE THE SHADOW OF THE LAW
If settlement outcomes simply reflect the expected outcome of
disputes at trial, then settlements are not relevant as a source of law.
Indeed, a famous maxim states that "bargaining occurs in the shadow
of the law" because parties derive settlement offers from the likely
amount that a court would award at trial. However, a more sophisti-
cated understanding of settlement dynamics has amended this basic
perspective on settlements. It is now widely understood that various
nonlegal factors often influence negotiated outcomes,9 leading to set-
8 See, e.g., David Luban, Settlements and the Erosion of the Public Realm, 83 GEO. L.J. 2619,
2624 n.27 (1995) (presenting anecdotal evidence that "lawyer buyout" has occurred in
several high profile mass tort cases including asbestos); Heather Waldbeser & Heather
DeGrave, Note, A Plaintiffs Lawyer's Dilemma: The Ethics of Entering a Confidential Settlement,
16 GEO.J. LEGAL ETHICS 815, 826 (2003) (arguing that "courts should decide whether such
a [secret] settlement would threaten the public interest").
9 In their landmark Essay, Robert Mnookin and Lewis Kornhauser first acknowl-
edged the effect of nonlegal factors on negotiated outcomes. They suggest that negotia-
tions may fail because of parties' different abilities to bear litigation costs, diverse attitudes
toward risk, asymmetric information, emotions, and strategic behavior. See Robert H.
Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88
YALE L.J. 950, 973 (1979) (suggesting two alternative models of bargaining: a strategic
model based on threat and bluff and a norm-centered model relying on legal and social
[Vol. 95:957
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tlement outcomes that differ from the expected value of a claim at
trial. These factors, which are unrelated to the substantive merits of a
legal dispute, may cause "novel" settlements that depart from the ex-
pected value of a claim at trial. Due to these extralegal considera-
tions, the terms of private settlement agreements may often be below
but also quite likely above legally available awards. As a result, settle-
ment trends may provide interesting departures from the conven-
tional expectation of the available legal remedies. This Section briefly
explores the influence of extralegal considerations on settlement bar-
gaining. In the next Section, I describe how information on innova-
tive settlements is shared both inside and outside legal communities.
The remainder of this Essay examines the impact of novel settlements
on the legal process more generally.
To illustrate the role of nonlegal factors on settlement outcomes,
consider, for example, the influence of cognitive limitations on bar-
gaining. Economists have developed robust models on the role of
asymmetric information1 ° and strategic behavior,11 describing how
parties may fail to accurately predict either the outcome of trial or the
response of the opposing party to their negotiation demands. In
these instances, litigation occurs because one of the parties either
overestimates his or her legal claim (thereby dissolving the bargaining
range) 12 or overestimates his or her ability to extract a larger share
from the opposing party (thereby causing a bargaining breakdown).13
norms); see also Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation: The Struc-
ture of Problem Solving, 31 UCLA L. REV. 754, 801-04 (1984) (emphasizing the role of eco-
nomic, legal, social, psychological, and ethical considerations in settlements).
10 On information costs as an explanation for litigation see, for example, Bruce L.
Hay, Effort, Information, Settlement, Trial, 24J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 42 (1995); Hylton, supra note
6, at 190; Kathryn E. Spier, The Dynamics of Pretrial Negotiation, 59 REv. ECON. STUD. 93,
97-99 (1992).
11 See Robert Cooter, Stephen Marks & Robert Mnookin, Bargaining in the Shadow of
the Law: A Testable Model of Strategic Behavior, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 225, 227-34 (1982) (devel-
oping a strategic model for analyzing settlement negotiations).
12 A number of economic models explain the occurrence of litigation in view of di-
verging expectations regarding the outcome of trial. Seesources cited supra note 6. See also
Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Litigation and Settlement Under Imperfect Information, 15 RAND J. ECON.
404, 406-09 (1984) (developing a model for measuring the effect of informational asym-
metries in settlement negotiations); Patricia Munch Danzon & Lee A. Lillard, Settlement Out
of Court: The Disposition of Medical Malpractice Claims, 12J. LEGAL STUD. 345, 347-51 (1983)
(using data on individual medical malpractice claims to empirically test established theory
on the settlement process).
13 For an example of a model of litigation where both parties are overly optimistic
regarding the value of the claim at trial, see Amy Farmer & Paul Pecorino, Pretrial Negotia-
tions with Asymmetric Information on Risk Preferences, 14 INT'L REv. L. & ECON. 273, 274-76
(1994). See also Cooter, Marks & Mnookin, supra note 11, at 227-34; Samuel R. Gross &
Kent D. Syverud, Getting to No: A Study of Settlement Negotiations and the Selection of Cases for
Trial 90 MICH. L. REv. 319, 341-78 (1991) (examining earlier strategic bargaining
frameworks in light of data on settlement negotiations in both personal injury cases and
commercial disputes).
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Because of their preoccupation with explaining why and when litiga-
tion occurs, economic theorists tend to focus almost exclusively on the
case where a party overextends or incorrectly inflates his or her claim
in a legal dispute, leading to bargaining breakdown. However, al-
though errors might lead parties to overestimate a claim, they might
likewise lead parties to underestimate the value of their claim or their
bargaining strength. As a result, plaintiffs or defendants may well set-
tle on terms that are less favorable than what would have been possi-
ble absent such information of bargaining weakness. Thus, while
errors are the dominant explanation for failed negotiations, relative
information and bargaining strengths may also lead to a subset of suc-
cessfully concluded setdements in which plaintiffs (1) extract awards
that exceed the expected value of the case at trial, or conversely (2)
settle at terms that are below the expected value of the case at trial.
Several other nonlegal determinants of bargaining lead to settle-
ments that depart from the expected value of trial.14 For instance,
idiosyncratic settlements are more probable when a disputant is con-
cerned with maintaining a professional reputation. A party may be
able to exploit a defendant's need to avoid the negative attention of
court proceedings and induce settlement offers that exceed legally
available remedies. Concerns with the "headliner effect" of a dispute
may thus lead to settlement outcomes that are above the expected
value of the case at trial.15
The principal-agent relationship between an attorney and his or
her client might also lead to deviations between a settlement outcome
and the expected value of trial. While the principal-agent relation-
ship has been analyzed most thoroughly with regard to the decision to
settle or litigate, 16 diverging interests between lawyers and clients also
impact the content of settlements. Processing a high volume of cases
often best serves the interests of plaintiffs' lawyers who work on a con-
14 Lack of information on settlements in most litigation data sets is a major obstacle to
testing and measuring differences in success rates and compensation amounts between
settled and tried disputes. Some studies have reported settlements below trial rates. See
JAMES S. KAKALIK, PATRICIA A. EBENER, WILLIAM L.F. FELSTINER, Gus W. HAGGSTROM &
MICHAEL G. SHANLEY, VAIUATION IN ASBESTOS LITIGATION COMPENSATION AND EXPENSES
xvi-xix (1984) (presenting data on average compensation in asbestos litigation and com-
paring claims that settled before trial with claims that went to trial). But see David S.
Kaplan, Joyce Sadka & Jorge Luis Silva-Mendez, Litigation and Settlement: New Evidence from
Labor Courts in Mexico, 5 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 309, 309 (2008) (finding that in labor
disputes workers recover less than 30 percent of their claims but receive higher percent-
ages of their claims in settlements than in trial judgments).
15 Note that other extralegal factors such as time and financial constraints might lead
disputants to settle at terms below the value of the case at trial.
16 See Geoffrey P. Miller, An Economic Analysis of Rule 68, 15 J. LEGAL STUD. 93, 111
(1986) (examining the effect of Rule 68 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure-which
requires unsuccessful plaintiffs to partially compensate defendants for litigation costs-on
settlement negotiations).
964 [Vol. 95:957
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tingency fee basis. 17 Similarly, defense attorneys have strong incen-
tives to settle disputes at rates below the expected value of the claim at
trial. Conversely, trial lawyers often have much to gain from pushing
for settlements that exceed the legally available remedies at trial.
First, because spectacular settlements attract more attention in legal
communities, trial lawyers may try to settle cases above the going trial
rate. Second, another principal-agent problem relates to the notion
that lawyers, as a group, benefit from litigation and higher recoveries
in lawsuits,' 8 while defendants are often more narrowly concerned
with the individual case.' 9 Third, in some areas of law, such as per-
sonal injury and products liability, the concept of protecting plaintiffs
is linked to public service and the pursuit of civil justice against corpo-
rations. In these circumstances, plaintiffs' lawyers have clear incen-
tives to push the frontiers of the law. These goals are served by
landmark court victories, but also by obtaining settlement awards and
remedies that are beyond currently available legal remedies.
In sum, extralegal factors may help drive the terms of private set-
tlement agreements below or above legally available awards. The next
Section documents how information on such novel settlements circu-
lates both within and outside legal communities.
II
AcCESS TO INFORMATION ON SETTLEMENTS
Although a subset of the literature assumes that settlement infor-
mation remains confined to the parties in a dispute, 20 this Essay chal-
lenges the notion that settlement agreements remain unknown to
anyone but the parties involved.21 I argue instead that, despite the
widespread use of nondisclosure agreements, information on settle-
17 "[I]f the lawyer is compensated according to the conventional contingent fee ar-
rangement... the lawyer may have an insufficient incentive to bring the case, may spend
too little time working on it if it is brought, and may encourage a settlement when the
client would be better off going to trial." A. Mitchell Polinsky & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Align-
ing the Interests of Lawyers and Clients, 5 AM. L. & ECON. REv. 165, 165 (2003) (proposing a
modified contingent fee system in which a third party compensates the lawyer for a certain
fraction of his costs, in return for which the lawyer pays an up-front fee).
18 See Michelle J. White, Legal Complexity and Lawyers' Benefit from Litigation, 12 INr'L
Rev. L. & ECON. 381, 393-95 (1992) (analyzing the level of legal complexity that attorneys
prefer when selecting cases). Note that higher levels of potential liability also increase the
value of the services offered by defense lawyers.
19 This applies especially if defendants are not repeat players. See Rubin & Bailey,
supra note 1, at 810.
20 See infra Part V.
21 "Because most attorneys will not draft a settlement agreement without some sort of
provision for confidentiality, scholars of the litigation system have come to characterize
settlements as 'invisible.'" Blanca Fromm, Bringing Settlement Out of the Shadows: Information
About Settlement in an Age of Confidentiality, 48 UCLA L. REV. 663, 664-65 (2001) (citing
Gross & Syverud, supra note 13, at 340).
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ments is available to those legal professionals for whom such informa-
tion is most valuable. Information on innovative settlements is
distributed both inside and outside legal communities, reaching ac-
tors through various channels including the oral culture in legal com-
munities, specialized reporters, professional interest organizations,
and mass media coverage. This Part briefly surveys the principal
sources of settlement information. An analysis of the incentives of the
parties involved suggests that information on novel settlements featur-
ing high awards and novel remedies is especially widely distributed. I
also report empirical findings on information sharing gleaned from a
survey of trial lawyers conducted for this Essay. Information on settle-
ments circulates more widely inside legal communities than generally
assumed. Lawyers generally admit that "word gets out" on the amount
and terms of many categories of settlements. Within local bar associa-
tions, lawyers communicate with one another and try to obtain infor-
mation and advice about settlements that are relevant to current
disputes.
A. Oral Culture
Although confidentiality clauses limit the type of settlement infor-
mation that lawyers can informally share, nondisclosure agreements
do not guarantee absolute secrecy. First, courts sometimes require
the disclosure of information contained in confidential settlements
when the information is important to efficient discovery in subse-
quent lawsuits.22 Second, statutes in many states restrict the parties'
ability to keep certain types of settlement agreements confidential-
for instance, when public safety issues are involved. 23 Third, lawyers
may disclose many aspects of concluded settlements without breach-
ing confidentiality clauses. Lawyers may be permitted to refer to set-
tlement awards in terms of the category of the claim and the size of
the award without disclosing the identity of the parties or personalized
information related to the case.24 Finally, possible violations of confi-
dentiality agreements will often remain undetected because of the
shared interests and the repeated interaction among lawyers.
Within these confines, lawyers and judges can draw upon their
experience and personal relations to keep abreast of novel settle-
22 See, e.g., Kalinauskas v. Wong, 151 F.R.D. 363, 367 (D. Nev. 1993) (holding that a
court can mandate individuals bound by a nondisclosure agreement as part of a settlement
to release information if the disclosure may enhance discovery in subsequent lawsuits with-
out causing substantial injury to the party opposing disclosure).
23 See infra Part V.
24 Cf Waldbeser & DeGrave, supra note 8, at 820 ("[C]onfidential settlement agree-
ments contain little or no substantive information pertaining to the allegations and usually
seal only the amount paid to the plaintiff." (citing Robert N. Weiner, Protective Orders and
Nest-Feathering, LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 23, 1991, at 29)).
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ments. Since lawyers increasingly specialize, they are able to draw
upon a larger selection of relevant prior settlements. Similarly, judges
can relate to their experiences as mediators in judicial settlement con-
ferences when they preside over settlement discussions. The height-
ened involvement of judges in the promotion of settlements, the
trend of managerial judging, and the role of specialized courts has
further amplified the experience of judges and their stock of relevant
knowledge on settlement practices. 25
The rise of large law firms has also increased the accessibility of
information on settlements.2 6 One of the comparative advantages of a
large law practice is the opportunity to share a great deal of sensitive
information among the partners and associates in the firm. Informa-
tion on emerging settlement practices, as gathered by the various part-
ners and associates of the firm, is an important human capital asset of
a large law firm.2 7 Similarly, individual plaintiff's lawyers establish va-
rious networks to build expertise and exchange professional
information. 28
B. Specialized Reporters
Specialized literature also contributes to the distribution of infor-
mation on settlements. Various professional publications provide fo-
cused settlement information regarding certain types of injuries, fields
of practice or jurisdictions. These publications include Settlements by
Categories, What's it Worth, Verdicts & Settlements in the Wisconsin Circuit,
North Texas Reports, etc.2 9
Printed publications on jury verdicts and settlement awards re-
present a niche in the legal publishing market.30 In addition, settle-
ment reporters are blossoming on the Internet. Various web sites
25 See discussion infra Part III.A.
26 See generally MARC GALANTER & THOMAS PALAY, TOURNAMENT OF LAWYERS: THE
TRANSFORMATION OF THE BIG LAW FIRM, 77-161 (1991) (documenting changes in the
American legal profession that accompany the rise of large law firms with intensive
specialization).
27 See David A. Dana & Susan P. Koniak, Secret Settlements and Practice Restrictions Aid
Lawyer Cartels and Cause Other Harms, 2003 U. ILL. L. REv. 1217, 1229-30 (explaining how,
in cases of correlated liability, attorneys can apply information and expertise from prior
settlements when pursuing cases for other potential clients). While this Essay focuses
mostly on the role of plaintiffs' lawyers, the potential for the pooling of settlement infor-
mation is, of course, also present in concentrated industries where a few large law firms
represent the major defendants. This observation is in line with the pre-existing notion
that repeat players, who are often defendants in major tort cases such as products liability
disputes, control the direction of dispute outcomes over time. See Galanter, supra note 1, at
97-114. In this regard, the control over settlement trends is another contributing factor to
the presumed control of major repeat player-defendants over the path of the law. See id.
The examples in this Essay focus mostly on plaintiffs' influence on settlement trends.
28 See infra Part II.C.
29 For a detailed list of these publications, see Fromm, supra note 21, at 708-34.
30 See id. at 684, 688.
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contain extensive databases including detailed information on jury
verdicts and settlement awards. 31 Modern technology increases op-
portunities for networking, enhancing the awareness of legal trends
and novel developments within legal communities.
The success of these expensive publications suggests that lawyers
particularly value information on settlements. Given the interest of
trial lawyers in pushing the boundaries of law, information on path-
breaking settlements is particularly relevant to these publications and
their subscribers.3 2 Settlement reporters "rely heavily on attorneys to
volunteer information about cases they have recently settled, many of
which will not have been approved by the court or reduced to an un-
sealed judgment incorporating the settlement terms. 33
C. Professional Interest Organizations
Professional organizations are a major source of information on
settlements. For instance, the American Association for Justice (AAJ,
formerly the Association of Trial Lawyers of America) collects infor-
mation and encourages trial lawyers to share their professional exper-
iences in publications34 and at conferences. 35 The AAJ provides a
research and information service, maintains a repository of data relat-
ing to cases tried by its members,3 6 organizes field-specific seminars
and conferences, 37 and coordinates litigation groups that specialize in
individual products or product areas.38  Membership publications,
such as the Products Liability Reporter, collect available briefs and settle-
ment verdicts from surveys.39
D. Media Coverage of Settlements
Media coverage is another source of information on settlements.
Reports on business and tort settlements have become a regular fea-
31 See id. at 685-86.
32 Cf id. at 693 ("[P]ublishers are also less interested in publishing low-end
settlements.").
33 Id. at 688-89.
34 See American Association for Justice, Professional Resources: Publications, http://
www.justice.org/cps/rde/xchg/justice/hs.xsl/502.htm (last visited Apr. 3, 2010).
35 See American Association for Justice, Professional Resources: Conventions, http://
www.justice.org/cps/rde/xchg/justice/hs.xsl/867.htm (last visited Apr. 3, 2010).
36 See American Association for Justice, Professional Resources: The AAJExchange, http://
www.justice.org/cps/rde/xchg/justice/hs.xsl/677.htm (last visited Apr. 3, 2010).
37 See American Association for Justice, Professional Resources: Continuing Legal Educa-
tion, http://www.justice.org/cps/rde/xchg/justice/hs.xsl/484.htm (last visited Apr. 3,
2010).
38 See American Association forJustice, Professional Resources: Litigation Groups, http://
www.justice.org/cps/rde/xchg/justice/hs.xsl/1150.htm (last visited Apr. 3, 2010).
39 See American Association for Justice, Publications: Products Liability Law Reporter,
http://www.justice.org/cps/rde/xchg/ustice/hs.xsl/506.htm (last visited Apr. 3, 2010).
[Vol. 95:957
HeinOnline  -- 95 Cornell L. Rev. 968 2009-2010
LAW IN THE SHADOW OF BARGAINING
ture in popular news reporting.40 The increased attention to settle-
ments in the general press is part of the expansion of law and legal
news into mainstream culture.
Unfortunately, media coverage of the legal system is highly selec-
tive and tends to focus on outlier cases where high, spectacular awards
govern. The extent of media distortion of legal news appears clearly
in a content analysis of 249 major news magazines by Bailis and Mac-
Coun.41 Compared to objective data on tort cases, magazines consid-
erably overrepresent controversial forms of litigation, such as product
liability and medical malpractice, the plaintiff victory rate at trial, and
median and mean jury awards.42 A series of studies have found similar
distortions in media representations of the outcomes of litigation in
other aspects of tort litigation, 43 demonstrating a strong bias with re-
gard to the types of cases and the size of awards and settlements that
receive attention in the media.4 4
Bias in the media's coverage of settlements is, in part, a product
of strategic disclosures of settlement information. A press leak on a
spectacular settlement can be a useful instrument to influence the
public perception of certain causes. 45 On the one hand, the release of
information on a settlement concession may hurt some producers of
defective products if it induces other claims by similarly situated vic-
tims. 46 On the other hand, news attention to outlier settlements or
40 See Daniel S. Bailis & Robert J. MacCoun, Estimating Liability Risks with the Media as
Your Guide, 80JUDICATURE 64, 64-67 (1996) (examining the level of objectivity exhibited by
popular media coverage of tort litigation from 1980 to 1990).
41 See id.
42 See Robert J. MacCoun, Media Reporting ofJury Verdicts: Is the Tail (of the Distribution)
Wagging the Dog?, 55 DEPAUL L. REV, 539, 541 (2006).
43 See, e.g., Oscar G. Chase, Helping Jurors Determine Pain and Suffering Awards, 23 HoF-
STRA L. REv. 763, 771-74 (1995) (comparing data on cases and media coverage of pain and
suffering); Neil R. Feigenson & Daniel S. Bailis, Air Bag Safety: Media Coverage, Popular Con-
ceptions, and Public Policy, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 444, 477-78 (2001) (comparing litiga-
tion data to media reports on airbag safety); Steven Garber & Anthony G. Bower, Newspaper
Coverage of Automotive Product Liability Verdicts, 33 LAw & Soc'v REv. 93, 119-21 (1999)
(comparing data on automotive product liability cases to media reports of these cases);
Laura Beth Nielsen & Aaron Beim, Media Misrepresentation: Title VII, Print Media, and Public
Perceptions of Discrimination Litigation, 15 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 237, 263-64 (2004) (compar-
ing litigation data to media reports on Title VII discrimination).
44 See Michael J. Saks, Public Opinion About the Civil Juy: Can Reality Be Found in the
Illusions?, 48 DEPAUL L. REv. 221, 232-34 (1998); see also Fromm, supra note 21, at 681
("Despite the depth of information about a particular settlement that the mass media
might offer, its coverage is usually limited to high-profile cases, which tend to lie at the
monetary and/or dignitary extremes. The cases covered by the media, therefore, tend not
to represent most cases that eventually settle, providing a distorted foundation for case
evaluation.") (footnote omitted).
45 I am grateful to Judge Guido Calabresi for suggesting the strategic aspect of settle-
ment disclosures and press leaks.
46 Interestingly, press memos on settlement announcements usually include a disclo-
sure that the defendant does not admit guilt or liability, suggesting that the decision to
compensate stems from goodwill or other considerations that are unrelated to the legal
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spectacular jury verdicts might bolster the public perception of a "liti-
gation explosion" in an overly litigious society.47 Settlement disclo-
sures may thus increase public sympathy for tort reform. Proponents
of such reform can use stunning jury verdicts and settlements to frame
or anchor awards in press releases and advertising.4 Arguably, exam-
ples of "'greedy plaintiffs and irrational juries"' offend popular stan-
dards of equity, justice, and morality, contributing to the perception
that reform is needed.49
E. Empirical Evidence
This section reports the findings of a survey conducted for this
Essay to assess the accessibility to and distribution of information on
settlements among lawyers. 50 One-thousand-three-hundred lawyers
were invited via e-mail and telephone to complete an online survey or
phone interview. 5' Lawyers were randomly selected (without regard
to field of practice) from the Florida and New York listings of the
Martindale Yellow Pages and the Verizon Superpages. Approximately
57 percent of respondents were defendant's lawyers, while 20 percent
identified themselves as plaintiff's lawyers. Twenty-five percent of law-
yers in the survey were products-liability lawyers. 52
claim or the issue of liability. See, e.g., Gregg Blesch, Fla. Practice, Former Director Agree to $12
million Settlement, MODERNHEALTHCARE.COM, Mar. 23, 2010, http://www.modernhealthcare.
com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20100323/NEWS/303239967# ("Scarbrough and the
practice dispute the allegations in the agreement, which stipulates that they don't admit
liability by settling."); John O'Connor, Sanford Pays Fine for Ethics Breach, Admits No Wrongdo-
ing, MIAMI HERALD, Mar. 27, 2010, http://www.miamiherald.com/2010/03/19/1537242/
sanford-pays-fine-for-ethics-breach.html; Sontaya Rose, Big Fresno Fair Settles E-Coli Poisoning
Lawsuit, ABC NEWS, Mar. 26, 2010, http://abclocal.go.com/kfsn/story?section=news/
local&id=7353475.
47 See I COMM. TO STUDY MED. PROF'L LIAB. & THE DELIVERY OF OBSTETRICAL CARE,
INST. OF MEDICINE, MEDICAL PROFESSIoNAL LIABILITY AND THE DELIVERY OF OBSTETRICAL
CARE 3 (1989) (discussing the relationship between explosive growth in medical malprac-
tice litigation and press attention based on large jury awards and settlements); Deborah L.
Rhode, Essay, Frivolous Litigation and Civil Justice Reform: Miscasting the Problem, Recasting the
Solution, 54 DUKE L.J. 447, 463-64 (2004) (asserting that selective reporting of exceptional
recoveries and frivolous suits leads to misperceptions of the likelihood of large recoveries).
48 For example, there has been an emergence of websites that post lawsuit settlements
daily and provide updates on the amount of the settlement awards. See, e.g., Lawyers and
Settlements, http://www.lawyersandsettlements.com (last visited Apr. 3, 2010).
49 MacCoun, supra note 42, at 558. However, such campaigns may backfire "because
they present[ ] descriptive normative information that conflict[s] with the stated injunctive
messages." Id. at 559. Indeed, ifjurors take such press releases as reality and infer commu-
nity standards from such coverage, media distortion might sustain the expansion of tort
awards and remedies. See discussion infra Part I1.
50 The survey is on file with the Cornell Law Review.
51 The survey included twelve statements. Respondents indicated on a 7-point Likert
scale the extent to which they agreed or disagreed with each statement.
52 Other fields represented were corporate law (3.1%), contract law (3.1%), profes-
sional liability (10.3%), class action litigation (2.1%) and various others (58%). The high
amount of products-liability lawyers in the sample is partially due to the higher representa-
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The data gathered from 114 responses 53 supports the notion that
information on settlements widely circulates in legal communities.
First, lawyers acknowledge that it is important to be knowledgeable
about settlements and are convinced that most lawyers possess rele-
vant settlement information. Ninety-six percent of litigators agree
that "[a] lawyer must keep an eye on developments in settlement
awards in their field of practice." 54 Seventy-seven percent of the re-
spondents agree or "fully" agree with the statement that "[1] awyers are
generally aware of the trends in settlement awards in their field of
practice." Strikingly, from the data it appears that respondents con-
sidered such information available despite nondisclosure agreements.
A majority of respondents agree that lawyers have "knowledge of prior
settlements in their field of practice" even when confidentiality agree-
ments apply (see Table 1, below). Lawyers indicate that they possess
knowledge about prior settlements in their field of practice especially
when "the award exceeds the expected value of a case at trial"
(56%).55 Only a relatively small group of respondents disagreed that
settlement information is not available when confidentiality agree-
ments apply.56
Lion of products-liability lawyers in the Martindale Yellow Pages and the Verizon
Superpages. Roughly measured, products-liability lawyers account for almost 40 percent of
areas of practice.
53 A 10 percent response rate is within the general expectation for a survey of this
nature. On response rates, see generally Frederick Wiseman, Methodological Bias in Public
Opinion Surveys, 36 PUB. OPINION Q. 105, 106-07 (1972) (studying whether differences in
the method used to collect data impacts response rates).
54 Of total respondents that agreed: 47 percent agreed strongly, 40 percent agreed
and 9 percent agreed slightly. Only one respondent disagreed (strongly).
55 I conducted a paired samples t-test for the statements "Despite confidentiality
agreements, lawyers have knowledge of prior settlements in their field of practice ('when
the award exceeds the expected value of a case at trial' and 'when the award is below the
expected value of a case at trial')." This analysis reveals a significant effect, t(104) = 4.23,
p < .001, indicating that respondents agree more strongly with this statement when the
award exceeds the expected value of a case at trial (M = 1.04) in comparison to when the
award is below the expected value of a case at trial (M= .47). Note that these results reflect
subjective values. Therefore, the data is subject to possible biases, such as overconfidence,
that lead people to think they know more than they actually do. For a collection of studies
on information bias, see generally JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY. HEURISTICS AND BIASES
(Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky eds., 1982).
56 Four percent of respondents indicated that they strongly disagreed with the state-
ment that "despite confidentiality agreements, lawyers are generally aware of the trends in
settlement awards in their field of practice."
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TABLE 1. SETTLEMENT INFORMATION AND CONFIDENTIALITY
"Despite confidentiality agreements, lawyers have knowledge of
prior settlements in their field of practice."
do not
strongly disagree agree nor agree strongly
disagree disagree slightly disagree slightly agree agree
a. Award > EV Trail 2% 9% 5% 18% 16% 36% 14%
(2) (10) (5) (19) (17) (38) (15)
b. Award < EV Trail 2% 15% 12% 22% 16% 25% 8%
(2) (16) (13) (23) (17) (26) (8)
Second, lawyers confirm that they obtain information on settle-
ments from conversations with other lawyers. Seventy percent of law-
yers talk among themselves about settlements in their field of practice.
Ninety-one percent of respondents state that they discuss "unusual set-
tlements (concerning the award or remedy)." Ninety-four percent of
lawyers state that partners inside law firms discuss "settlements they
were involved in." Moreover, it appears that lawyers talk among them-
selves about prior settlements in their field of practice, especially
when "the award exceeds the expected value of a case at trial" (out of
89% positive responses, 49% strongly agree), as well as (but again to a
lesser extent) 57 when the award is "below the expected value of a case
at trial" (out of 71% positive responses, 26% strongly agree).
TABLE 2. CONTENT OF SETTLEMENTS & INFORMATION EXCHANGE
"Lawyers discuss settlements in their field of practice."
do not
strongly disagree agree nor agree strongly
disagree disagree slightly disagree slightly agree agree
a. Award > EV Trail 2% 3% 1% 5% 6% 34% 49%
(2) (3) (1) (5) (7) (37) (53)
b. Award < EV Trail 2% 8% 10% 8% 11% 34% 26%
(2) (8) (11) (9) (12) (36) (28)
Judges also exchange informal information regarding legal dis-
putes. In a survey summarized by Marc Galanter, half of the judges
answered that they "occasionally" learn about jury verdicts in trial
courts other than their own through publications or informal conver-
sations. 58 The study found that one-third of judges are aware of the
57 A paired samples t-test for the statement "Lawyers talk among themselves about
settlements in their field of practice" indicates a significant effect, t05) = 5.06, p < .001,
revealing that respondents agree more with this statement when the award exceeds the
expected value of a case at trial (M = 2.08) compared to when the award is below the
expected value of a case at trial (M = 1.27).
58 See Marc Galanter, The Civil Jury as Regulator of the Litigation Process, 1990 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 201, 234 & n.152 (1990) (citing unpublished data collected by former University
of Wisconsin Law School student Christopher J. Brown).
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terms of settlements in their own court in more than 60 percent of
settlements. 59 One-third of the participating judges acknowledged
that they find out about the terms of settlements in roughly 30 to 60
percent of the cases, whereas one-third estimated that they are aware
about less than 30 percent of settlements in their court.60 The empiri-
cal study conducted for this Essay illustrates that lawyers expect that
judges share information regarding settlements. Sixty percent of the
participating lawyers indicate that they believe that 'judges talk
among themselves about settlements," while only 10 percent of re-
spondents disagree. 61 Seventy-two percent of participating lawyers be-
lieve that "lj] udges are aware of trends in settlements in their district."
To conclude, the theoretical and empirical evidence that I pre-
sent in this Part suggests that the supposed strict division between the
private realm of settlement agreements and the public forum of trial
outcomes is naive. First, although information on settlement agree-
ments is not generally available to the public, as opposed to published
verdicts, legal professionals-to whom such information is most rele-
vant-are aware of emerging settlement trends. The availability of in-
formation on settlements enables the feedback effect discussed below
in Parts III and IV.
Second, the distribution of information on settlements among
trial lawyers is biased towards outlier concessions. As suggested by the
survey results, lawyers are more likely to discuss remarkable, high-
value settlements that generate higher fees for trial lawyers and open
future opportunities in negations. Similarly, the services of special-
ized settlement reporters and professional organizations are more val-
uable if they offer new exchange opportunities resulting from
information on high awards or novel remedies in settlements. Finally,
popular media reports tend to focus on spectacularly generous re-
wards or novel remedies. Third, as I will describe in more detail in
Part III, the selective availability of settlement information plays an
important role in the subtle influence that novel settlements have on
the path of the law.
59 See id. at 234 n.152. The remaining responses were divided equally between "less
than 30 percent" and "between 30 to 60 percent." Id.
60 See id.
61 The spread is as follows: while 30 percent of lawyers report that they do not agree
or disagree, 60 percent stated that they agree (16% agree slightly, 30% agree, 14% strongly
agree).
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III
THE FEEDBACK EFFECT OF SETTLEMENTS
Although settlements lack a formally binding power, novel settle-
ments may influence the path of the law in several ways.
First of all, prior settlements influence future settlements. Prior
settlement concessions increase the demand for future awards. Plain-
tiffs in future cases become more demanding and more reluctant to
accept settlements below what has previously been conceded in analo-
gous settlements. Ambitious trial lawyers will use prior settlements as
minimum bargaining thresholds. These demand-side dynamics are
most prominent in class action and major state-initiated litigation.
Here, major settlement concessions in one state often invigorate simi-
lar claims in other states. Recent examples include the nationwide
litigation campaigns against the tobacco industry62 and the antitrust
suits against the Microsoft Corporation. 63 In both instances, the con-
centrated efforts of the trial lawyers involved in prior settlements64
culminated in a nationwide demand for restitution.
Prior settlement concessions will make future negotiations harder
for the defendant or for similarly situated parties in future disputes.
But novel settlements and settlement trends may also affect adjudica-
tion. The following two subsections describe the subtle influence of
civil settlements on trial outcomes.
A. The Framing Effect of Settlements
Although adjudication and settlements were once considered en-
tirely distinct categories, today they have become increasingly interre-
lated due to the expanding role of judges in the settlement process. 65
Procedural reforms have considerably amplified the judge's role in
62 See Milo Geyelin, States Agree to $206 Billion Tobacco Deal, WALL ST. J., Nov. 23, 1998,
at B13 (discussing various states' settlement efforts with the tobacco industry). These ef-
forts culminated in a groundbreaking agreement between the government and the
tobacco industry; however, individual litigation against the tobacco companies continues.
See id. For the settlement agreement in question, see Master Settlement Agreement, availa-
ble at http://www.naag.org/backpages/naag/tobacco/msa/msa-pdf/ (follow the "Master
Settlement Agreement" hyperlink; then follow the "Download" hyperlink).
63 On November 6, 2001, the United States and Microsoft agreed to a revised pro-
posed Final Judgment to resolve the United States' civil antitrust case against Microsoft. See
Information on the United States v. Microsoft Settlement, Antitrust Case Filings, ANTITRUST
DIVISION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OFJusTICE, http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/ms-settle.htm (last
visited Apr. 3, 2010).
64 For instance, trial attorneys, working with several states on their lawsuits against the
tobacco companies, coordinated the nationwide tobacco litigation. See A Review of the
Global Tobacco Settlement: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 1 (1997)
(statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch, Chairman, S. Comm. on the Judiciary).
65 See Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, "Most Cases Settle": Judicial Promotion and Regulation
of Settlements, 46 STAN. L. REv. 1339, 1348 (1994).
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brokering settlements.6 6 Judges reach beyond adjudication and are
also involved in pretrial settlement conferences, dispute processing,
mediation, and evaluations of settlements. 67
The increased involvement of judges in settlement oversight to-
day expands the potential shadow of prior settlements over future dis-
putes. The judge's role as a settlement intermediary in settlement
conferences lies partly in framing the dispute within the wider context
of judicial precedents and all past and present disputes in his or her
court. For judges, then, prior settlements are a benchmark or refer-
ence point from which to consider the merits of future, similar cases.
This might affect disputes in several ways.
First, members of the judiciary obtain valuable information dur-
ing settlement conferences. In product liability cases, for instance, a
prior settlement agreement might provide important information on
standards of care, production standards, bargaining thresholds, and
other data important to the resolution of a tort claim. The bargaining
position of other defendants in similar disputes may become weak-
ened as such information surfaces. In the course of judicial interven-
tion, judges may obtain information on industry customs, cost
structures, incentives and strategies. Perhaps for this reason, empiri-
cal studies indicate that lawyers have a favorable disposition toward
judicial intervention in settlement negotiations. 68 In pretrial negotia-
tions, judges can offset some of the information advantages that large
law firms have over individual lawyers. For an inexperienced lawyer, a
judge offers access to information on industry conditions and behav-
ior that would otherwise be difficult to obtain. 6 9 Judges provide nego-
tiators with access to settlement standards and reduce the
opportunities to exploit information asymmetries among litigants.7 0
Second, settlement conferences also provide lawyers with oppor-
tunities to inform the opposing party and the judge of emerging
66 SeeJudith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARv. L. REV. 374, 379 (1982) (stating that
judges have been "persuading litigants to settle rather than try cases whenever possible").
67 Some have criticized judicial intervention in settlements as it, arguably, may result
in "coerced" settlements. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 9, at 775; see also Maurice Rosen-
berg, Judicial Discretion of the Trial Court, Viewed from Above, 22 SYRACUSE L. RaV. 635, 657-58
(1971) (labeling judicial discretion "pervasive" in the context of the modern litigation
process).
68 Several studies establish that lawyers generally approve ofjudicial intervention. See
WAYNE D. BRAZIL, SETTLING CIVIL SUITS: LITIGATORS' VIEWS ABOUT APPROPRIATE ROLES AND
EFFECTIVE TECHNIQUES FOR FEDERAL JUDGES 1-2 (1985) (finding that 85 percent of polled
attorneys believe that judicial intervention improves settlement prospects); Dale E. Rude &
James A. Wall, Jr., Judicial Involvement in Settlement: How Judges and Lauyers View It, 72JUDICA-
TURE 175, 177 (1988) (finding that 67 percent of attorneys favored judicial intervention in
settlement even if local rules did not mandate active judicial participation).
69 See Rude & Wall, supra note 68, at 177 (finding that 61 percent of polled judges
reported that they inform attorneys about how similar cases have been settled).
70 See id.
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settlement trends. Although confidentiality clauses may protect the
precise terms of settlement agreements, lawyers can make implicit ref-
erences to prior settlements by referring to emerging trends and cus-
toms while omitting the particular details of such settlement
precedents. The interviews and surveys conducted for this Essay,
presented in Part II.E above, confirm the usefulness of prior settle-
ment information. When asked whether referring to settlements can
be useful,71 65 percent of participating lawyers agreed that "[i] t is
helpful to refer to settlements in similar cases that are favorable to
your case when in front of a judge in settlement conferences. '72
Ninety percent of those lawyers indicated that "[i] t is helpful to refer
to settlements in similar cases that are favorable to your case when in
negotiations with opposing counsel without the presence of a
judge. 73
Third, prior settlements in similar disputes may similarly impact
the perception of judges, arbitrators, and court mediators in settle-
ment conferences. Given their noncoercive nature, settlement agree-
ments may be perceived in a normative light. Judges, for instance,
may interpret settlement precedents as expressive statements regard-
ing the appropriateness of compensation.74 Once a novel legal claim
for tort compensation has been gratified by a (presumed) concession
of the same sort in a private settlement agreement, future claims will
be perceived as less extraordinary. If a company refuses to accept an
offer that is comparable to concessions that competitors made in prior
settlements, judges might be less sympathetic to that firm in subse-
quent proceedings. When the judge considers these standards in set-
tlement conferences, bench trials, or remittitur,75 he or she might
perceive this as enforcing an industry norm, instead of introducing
novel changes to existing law. In this sense, settlement conferences
71 The potential usefulness of settlement information is, of course, still higher within
settlement conferences than in trial. The higher degree of informality of decision making
in the former will allow more explicit references to prior settlements in similar cases. See
generally Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Private Ordering Through Negotiation: Dispute-Settlement and
Rulemaking, 89 HARV. L. REv. 637, 649-52 (1976) (discussing the invocation of precedent
during settlement negotiations).
72 See infra Part IV.
73 The informal nature of settlement discussions frees settlementjudges to work more
closely with the parties and the evidence than they otherwise could. See BRAZIL, supra note
68, at 10o
74 Generally, the social meaning of settlements also determines the persuasive force
of prior settlements. Settlements have become a more common solution to legal conflicts
and are subject to regular media attention. As a result, foregoing this means of dispute
resolution may be looked upon unfavorably.
75 On the rise of the active role of judges, see supra notes 64-66 and accompanying
text.
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are an opportunity for judges to reinforce settlement norms and
standards.76
Overall, prior settlements exert pressure on similarly situated par-
ties, effectively weakening their position in comparable disputes. 77
When a future defendant or plaintiff refuses to settle at terms that
similarly situated disputants have previously conceded, the former
might be considered opportunistic by judges in settlement confer-
ences by refusing to abide by industry norms or standards. Due to
prior concessions in private settlements, it might become harder, for
instance, for similarly situated defendants to contest similar claims
outright, as the settlement precedent reduces the perceived unreason-
ableness of the novel claim to a judge. If prior settlement standards
influence the opinion of a judge,78 then these standards may have a
subtle effect on both the outcome of settlements in pretrial negotia-
tions and, if the parties fail to reach a settlement, on subsequent trial
proceedings. For instance, the experience and information that a
judge (or one of his or her colleagues) may gain in prior settlement
conferences might influence that judge's damages ruling in trial.
Thus, by making it harder for litigants to recede from concessions that
similarly situated parties have already made, prior settlements affect
both the future supply of settlements and the chances at trial. I turn
next to this issue.
B. The Public Perception of Settlements
In the previous subsection, I suggested that prior settlements may
exert subtle pressure on trial outcomes by influencing judges and law-
yers. In this Section I argue that settlement information may also find
its way into the legal process by influencing the viewpoints of jury
members.
Take the example of tort disputes. One of the main functions of
juries is to estimate losses when damages cannot easily be derived
from market indicators. In order to do their job effectively, juries
76 See Jonathan M. Purver, Evaluation and Settlement of Personal Injury and Wrongful
Death Cases, 53 Am. JUR. TRiALs § 240 at 228 (1995) ("In settlement conferences, exper-
ienced and skilled settlement judges will put as much pressure on both sides as they can.
The judges will literally pound away with arguments and positions. They will try to get the
parties closer so as to make it more difficult, from an economic standpoint, for the parties
to take the case to trial.").
77 See Fromm, supra note 21, at 672 ("By referencing past settlements, an attorney can
persuade the other side that his offer or demand is reasonable.").
78 During pretrial settlement conferences, parties try to obtain an estimate of what
the judge considers to be a fair settlement. Confidential meetings and private caucusing
are the most opportune moments for a judge to explain his viewpoint on the case and to
evaluate the viewpoints of both opponents. Sophisticated settlement judges and exper-
ienced trial lawyers favor such separate meetings over any other conference format be-
cause they promote candor. See Purver, supra note 76, at 228.
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need to both possess basic information regarding the legal system and
to understand how the legal process has handled similar disputes in
the past. An important way in which jurors learn about the legal sys-
tem is through popular media coverage.
As a result of the bias in mainstream news coverage, 79 however,
jurors likely base their perceptions of average damage awards on ver-
dicts involving spectacular damage awards or cases involving novel ap-
plications of liability.8 0 Findings from cognitive psychology show that
salient information is highly conducive to anchoring and availability
heuristics, causing individuals to attribute disproportionate weight to
such memorable evidence.8 1 The public's poor understanding of le-
gal institutions amplifies the pervasive effect of popular media cover-
age of legal issues. When professional commentators decry the
alarming state of excessive litigation, they often conflate settlements,
awards, and judgments.8 2 Blurring these distinctions is problematic,
especially in cases when the public draws inferences from publications
of jury verdicts or settlement announcements in news reports. Since
media coverage of related lawsuits tends to influence juries,8 3 it is rea-
sonable to assume that information on settlements will likewise influ-
ence attitudes of jurors and their perceptions of right and wrong. As
such, information on settlements will influence the viewpoints of ju-
ries, regardless of whether the information is representative of settle-
ments as a whole.8 4 The potential for bias might be even greater for
settlements than forjury verdicts because, as I demonstrated in Part II,
access to information on settlements largely depends upon the private
supply of settlement information.8 5 Apart from cases that received
79 See supra Part II.D and sources cited.
80 See AndrewJ. Wistrich, Chris Guthrie &JeffreyJ. Rachlinski, Can Judges Ignore Inad-
missible Information? The Difficulty of Deliberately Disregarding, 153 U. PA. L. REv. 1251, 1259
(2005) (providing experimental evidence of judges' inability to disregard inadmissible
information).
81 See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Frequency
and Probability, 5 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 207, 208 (1973) ("A person is said to employ the
availability heuristic whenever he estimates frequency or probability by the ease with which
instances or associations could be brought to mind."); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman,
Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124, 1128 (1974) ("In many
situations, people make estimates by starting from an initial value that is adjusted to yield
the final answer.... [D]ifferent starting points yield different estimates, which are biased
toward the initial values. We call this phenomenon anchoring.").
82 See Galanter, supra note 58, at 224 n.111.
83 See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
84 Attention to major settlement awards might lead juries to infer that such awards are
a developing practice that deserves support or, conversely, may instill a perception that the
tort system is out of control. See supra Part II.D and sources cited.
85 The role of the media is pervasive here because lawyers do not make references to
settlement discussions or prior settlements. Various courts have held that mentioning set-
tlement discussions during opening statements and closing arguments is improper. See
KENT' SINCLAIR, TRIAL HANDBOOK §§ 3:8, 5:5 (3d ed. 2009). This reduces lawyers' influence
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media attention during trial, the media depends on attorneys and in-
terest groups to draw attention to settled cases. The media attention
to outlier settlements might have a significant influence on jury view-
points. Jury studies suggest that, despite instructions to the contrary,
information that juries gather outside of trial has lasting impact. One
study has demonstrated, for instance, that unfavorable information,
such as a party's prior conviction, produces higher rates of conviction
even when a judge rules that such information was inadmissible.8 6
IV
SETTLEMENTS, PRECEDENT, AND LEGAL CHANGE
The feedback effect of settlements, as Part III described, suggests
that the outcome of a settlement may reach beyond the individual
settlement agreement and affect adjudication. The potential impact
of settlements on adjudication complicates the choice between settle-
ment and litigation and, depending on this result, might affect the
course of the law. In this Part, I more closely examine the impact of
the feedback effect of settlements on litigants' behavior while adapt-
ing classic models of the choice between litigation and settlement.
Let us analyze the feedback effect of settlements in the context of
two sequential disputes. When deciding between litigation at trial or
settlement in Dispute 1, the plaintiff and defendant will consider the
costs and benefits of each option. To the defendant, the expected
losses from a trial in Dispute 1 consist of the sum of the costs from the
expected award in Dispute 1 and any likely payouts that result in Dis-
pute 2 given the judicial precedent that was set in Dispute 1. This
in focusing attention on outlier settlements but also restricts the opportunity of lawyers to
dispel possible media distortions in court.
86 Kerri L. Pickel, Inducing Jurors to Disregard Inadmissible Evidence: A Legal Explanation
Does Not Help, 19 LAw & HuM. BEHAV. 407, 415 (1995) ("[R]eceiving a legal explanation did
not help [mock jurors] disregard inadmissible evidence."); Roselle L. Wissler, Allen J. Hart
& Michael J. Saks, Decisionmaking About General Damages A Comparison of Jurors, Judges, and
Lawyers, 98 MICH. L. REv. 751, 805 (1999) (rebutting the criticism of extreme jury awards
by demonstrating how jurors, judges, and lawyers accord similar monetary awards for vari-
ous types of injuries); Wistrich, Gurthrie & Rachlinksi, supra note 80, at 1307 ("Exposure to
the plaintiffs prior criminal conviction appears to have influenced the judges' decisions,
even though most judges ruled to suppress the information."). Moreover, instructions to
disregard certain evidence are often counterproductive, as they highlight that admonished
information in the mind ofjurors. The process by which people ultimately spend more
time thinking about something they are told to suppress is referred to as the "ironic pro-
cess." See generally Daniel M. Wegner, Ironic Processes of Mental Control, 101 PSYCHOL. REv. 34,
34 (1994) (developing a theory "to account for the intentional and counterintentional
effects that result from efforts at self-control of mental states"); Daniel M. Wegner, David J.
Schneider, Samuel R. Carter III & Terri L. White, Paradoxical Effects of Thought Suppression,
53 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 5, 5 (1987) (analyzing an experiment that tested the
participants' preoccupation with a specific thought that they were told to suppress).
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Essay claims that novel settlements have a feedback effect.87 Settle-
ments in Dispute 1 affect the likely award in a trial of disputes in Dis-
pute 2.88 This is because, as I described in Part III above, prior
settlements set new goals for plaintiffs' lawyers, and the perception of
emerging settlement trends influences judges' and juries' opinions of
what constitutes a 'just" award in similar disputes.
Several observations follow from this general effect. First, the
feedback of past settlements on future litigation increases the poten-
tial costs of any given settlement concession. The feedback effect of
the settlement in Dispute 1 will reduce the maximum amount that the
defendant will be willing to award in any settlement agreement in Dis-
pute 2. More specifically, it decreases the maximum amount that the
defendant will concede in a settlement, while leaving unaffected the
minimum settlement demand of the plaintiff. The feedback effect of
a settlement in Dispute 1 is especially costly to defendants who might
face similar claims in the future. Upon first impression, the feedback
effect reduces the bargaining range in settlements, leading to more
litigation. However, note that the only way for a defendant to avoid
the costs of settlement in Dispute 1 is by going to trial. And at trial,
the defendant, of course, faces the potential costs of adverse judicial
precedent. If we assume that the precedent costs of judicial decisions
are higher than the costs of settlement feedback (due to the higher
visibility and formal authority of the former), the feedback effect does
not necessarily alter the ratio of trials to settlements. However, the
potential effect of a settlement in Dispute 1 on trial outcomes in fu-
ture disputes increases the defendant's stake in the dispute. Because
higher stakes increase the impact of relative optimism (and, conse-
quently, the room for disagreement), the feedback effect of settle-
ments might lead to an overall increase in the probability of litigation.
Second, as I outlined in Part II, the distribution of information
on settlements is biased towards spectacular, outlier concessions.89
High-value settlement awards circulate more broadly and may some-
times have a disproportionate effect on the perception ofjudges and
juries.90 In this sense, a generous settlement concession in Dispute 1
87 An adverse settlement precedent on liability issues may also increase the probability
of a victory for future plaintiffs in similar disputes.
88 As argued above, a settlement concession in Dispute I also makes settlement nego-
tiations more difficult in Dispute 2.
89 The informal nature of communication in legal communities and the incentives of
the parties involved in releasing settlement information enhances the distribution of this
information. See supra Part II.A.
90 See supra Part II.D and sources cited. Also, consider that, contrary to publicly re-
leased information on judicial decisions, the informal nature of settlement information
prevents public correction with objective statistical information.
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has a particularly strong impact on the expected losses of similarly
situated defendants in analogous disputes.
This analysis presents a number of interesting refinements of the
literature on litigants' choice between trial and settlement. Settle-
ment does not offer an easy out to a defendant concerned with an
unfavorable trial outcome.91 The choice is rather between adverse ju-
dicial precedent and adverse settlement precedent. In considering
the costs and benefits of trial or settlement, a defendant will thus need
to weigh the costs from the inherent bias that some settlement prece-
dents produce against the higher visibility and (formal) authority of
judicial precedents.
The feedback effect of settlements also provides a possible expla-
nation for the evolution of awards and remedies in various areas of
law. To the extent that information in settlements can be applied by
analogy to similarly situated defendants in other suits, prior settle-
ments create a pressure toward further concessions. In the absence of
effective coordination, defendants cannot take into account the costs
that their own settlement imposes on similarly situated companies.
Settlement agreements thus introduce a collective action problem
among potential defendants. Future defendants would rather see a
novel claim fought off, but when individually faced with a claim, they
prefer to settle the dispute and avoid the negative attention of a day in
court. As the individual logic has it, why would one firm bear the full
cost of litigating to obtain a favorable precedent that benefits the en-
tire industry, including the firm's competitors?
Without some level of coordination, similarly situated defendants
might leak information in settlement negotiations that will later dete-
riorate the bargaining position of competitors in comparable dis-
putes. The immediate interest of the negotiator lies in absolving the
particular defendant. Hence, the negotiating parties might "not care
if the plaintiff obtains an opinion that greatly benefits other plain-
tiffs" 92 against other defendants. The litigation against the tobacco
industry in the 1990s, for instance, illustrates the collective action
problem inherent in settlements. A novel settlement involving one
tobacco company spurred the initial litigation against the rest of the
industry. Although, at the time, the tobacco industry had yet to suffer
a loss in court,93 the Liggett tobacco company agreed to pay the states
91 The analysis is different in situations where only the plaintiff is concerned with
precedent. In those instances, there is a real exit option because a plaintiff is, of course, in
the position to drop the claim and avoid any precedent, be it a judicial precedent or a
settlement precedent.
92 See Rubin & Bailey, supra note 1, at 810.
93 There is one exception in which a trial jury in Florida awarded $750,000 to a victim
of lung cancer. See Carter v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 778 So.2d 932, 935 (Fla.
2000).
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25 percent of its pretax profits over the next twenty-five years and to
label its cigarette packages with a warning that "smoking is addic-
tive." 94 Liggett disgorged documents showing that the industry knew
that its products were addictive, designed them to be that way, with-
held that knowledge from consumers, and targeted minors with its
ads. 95 Since Liggett was the smallest of the major tobacco companies,
some analysts argued that its willingness to settle was mere posturing
to attract a merger partner.96 Not long after the highly publicized
admissions of the Liggett settlement, the major tobacco companies
initiated their own settlement talks. 97
Without effective coordination, similarly situated stakeholders
will not be able to adopt the optimal group strategy to stave off novel
court claims. Consequently, such stakeholders will not be able to
avoid acceptance of the legitimacy of these claims by the public in
general and legal communities in particular. This leads to the hypoth-
esis that awards will increase more over time in areas of the law where
defendants are relatively heterogeneous, such that individual settle-
ments are not easily avoided through coordination or industry
norms.98 In these instances, the feedback effect of settlements infuses
a proplaintiff component into the legal process, providing some coun-
terweight to the downward bias that selective litigation by experienced
repeat players causes.99
In other instances, however, the feedback effect of settlements
reinforces the influence of powerful, well-organized litigants. For
instance, in disputes that either typically do not attract a strong pres-
ence of the plaintiff bar or where relatively heterogeneous plaintiffs
face a concentrated industry with closely organized defense counsel,
defendants will likely carefully catalogue individual concessions by
plaintiffs and use them selectively in future disputes. Insurance com-
94 See Milo Geyelin & Suein L. Hwang, Liggett to Settle 22 States' Tobacco Suits, WALL ST.
J., Mar. 21, 1997, at A3.
95 See id. No tobacco company had, at the time, ever been held liable in court when
Mississippi concluded the first settlement agreement. See id.
96 See id.
97 See Alix M. Freedman & Suein L. Hwang, Philip Morris, RJR and Tobacco Plaintiffs
Discuss a Settlement, WALL ST. J., Apr. 16, 1997, at Al.
98 This is in accordance with the collective action perspective on the evolution of law,
which postulates that areas of law expand more rapidly if plaintiffs are supported by the
presence of long-term stakeholders in the expansion of remedies and awards. See Rubin &
Bailey, supra note 1, at 808-13. Trial lawyers are repeat players with a stake in the increase
of products liability lawsuits and the expansion of several areas of tort law. See, e.g., Richard
A. Epstein, The Political Economy of Product Liability Reform, 78 AM. ECON. REv. 311, 313-14
(1988); Richard A. Epstein, The Unintended Revolution in Product Liability Law, 10 CARDOZO
L. RaV. 2193, 2219 (1989); White, supra note 18, at 385-89; Todd J. Zywicki, The Rise and
Fall of Efficiency in the Common Law: A Supply-Side Analysis, 97 Nw. U. L. REv. 1551, 1554-62
(2003).
99 See Galanter, supra note 1, at 97-114; George L. Priest, Reexamining the Selection Hy-
pothesis: Learning from Wittman's Mistakes, 14J. LEGAL STUD. 215, 219 (1985).
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panies, for instance, are ideally positioned to obtain information on
settlement trends and, subsequently, emphasize downward trends in
future dispute negotiations, settlement conferences, or in front of
judges and juries.
These effects are compounded in the context of settlements be-
cause, as described earlier in this Part, the settlement feedback effect
increases the stakes in settlements, leading to additional trials. Over-
all then, the feedback effect of novel settlements may contribute to
increasing or decreasing awards and legal remedies over time.
V
SECRET SETITLEMENTS AND MANDATORY DISCLOSURE
One strand of literature condemns the secrecy of settlements.100
This strand argues that private settlements are suspect because they
withhold public information, including information regarding public
safety and health issues. Thus, confidential settlements seemingly pre-
clude the creation of judicial precedents.101 Since settlements lack
the "public value" component of litigation, some scholars oppose set-
tlements as an alternative to resolving disputes through judicial adju-
dication 0 2 because it deprives judges of the opportunity to expound
legal values. 103 Moreover, confidential settlements work to the detri-
ment of the public by delaying awareness of underlying liability issues.
Because the tortfeasor's costs of settling are usually lower than the
costs imposed on other victims who remain unaware of the cause of
harm, tortfeasors have an incentive to bury those facts that are most
likely to induce liability in confidential agreements. 10 4 As a result, se-
crecy potentially reduces the deterrent effect of the tort system.
How does the preceding analysis bear on the ongoing debate re-
garding the wisdom of secrecy versus mandatory disclosure of private
settlements? My theory has ambiguous implications for this issue. On
the one hand, I suggest that secrecy in the case of settlements is rela-
100 See, e.g., Jules Coleman & Charles Silver, Justice in Settlements, 4 Soc. PHIL. & POL'Y
102, 114-19 (1986) (admonishing secret nature of settlements); Leandra Lederman, Prece-
dent Lost: Why Encourage Settlement, and Why Permit Non-Party Involvement in Settlements?, 75
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 221, 256 (1999) (illustrating cases where the public benefit of ob-
taining confidential information might outweigh the benefits of secrecy to the parties in-
volved in the settlement).
101 See Coleman & Silver, supra note 100, at 114-19.
102 See, e.g., Luban, supra note 8, at 2624 n.27 (expressing ethical concerns with regard
to confidential settlements that involve valuable public information).
103 Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984) (arguing that settlements
deny courts the ability to expound society's values).
104 In economic terms, confidential settlements allow prior victims to free-ride off of
the costs of other potential future plaintiffs if there is a potential of correlated liability. See
Daughety & Reinganum, Hush Money, supra note 7, at 674-75; Daughety & Reinganum,
Informational Externalities, supra note 7, at 588.
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tive. As Part I demonstrates, information about settlements is availa-
ble through a wide array of formal and informal sources. In this
sense, the data from the survey supports the claim that public safety
issues are usually available in the industry as soon as such settlements
come to light.'0 5 On the other hand, because information on settle-
ments influences legal outcomes, it may be desirable to make informa-
tion on settlements more widely available. Much of the discussion
above has focused on the circulation of information on settlements,
the role of the media, and the use of settlement information by savvy
lawyers and managerial judges in settlement conferences. A common
theme is the potential bias that results from the nonrepresentative na-
ture of the information on settlements that is available. Settlements
are selectively picked up by the press, disclosed by interest groups, or
used by in-the-know lawyers and influential judges.10 6 This creates a
danger of bias because the information on settlements is either only
selectively available for the public or accessible only to a select
community.
Potential distortions by nonrepresentative information will likely
lessen if information on settlements is more extensively available to
the public. If more representative reports on settlement trends substi-
tute for sensational media coverage as a source of settlement prece-
dent, this will remove some of the biased effects on legal change that I
highlighted in the previous Part. On the other hand, it might be na-
ive to assume that wider access to settlements will shift the focus of
media reports to more representative information about settle-
ments-especially if a strong demand for salient news content drives
media attention to outlier settlements. 10 7 Nevertheless, a ban on se-
cret settlements or a policy of mandatory disclosure would provide
analysts of settlement trends with superior access to information in
order to rebut some of the inaccurate portrayals of the settlement
landscape that popular media creates. Improved settlement data
might also reduce uncertainty and lead to additional settlements.
At first glance, a rule of mandatory disclosure would seem to am-
plify the potential feedback of settlements that this Essay suggests.
When all settlements are public goods, information on settlement
agreements will surface in broader, more transparent channels of in-
formation distribution. This will arguably reduce the role of close-
knit, professional networks and confidential legal communities as in-
formation pools in favor of publicly available databases of the sort that
105 See Arthur R. Miller, Confidentiality, Protective Orders, and Public Access to the Courts,
105 HARv. L. REV. 427, 486 (1991) (describing how mandatory disclosure statutes have a
chilling effect on settlements).
106 See discussion supra Part II.
107 See MacCoun, supra note 42, at 551-59 (providing a stimulus-based explanation
whereby journalists as well as audiences give disproportionate weight to extremes).
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are increasingly surfacing on the Internet. The broader circulation of
settlements would also embed outlier settlements in a larger body of
settlements, including those settlements where plaintiffs received less
than the predicted trial outcome.
On the other hand, mandatory disclosure standards may chill
parties' incentives to settle because they remove the opportunity to
stave off negative public attention by settling.108 Although there is
only weak empirical support for the chilling effect of settlement sun-
shine provisions, 10 9 mandatory disclosures could increase the backlog
of courts by increasing the number of trials. 110 It is important to note
that a ban on secret settlements does not affect the freedom of parties
to settle disputes without revealing information before the court pro-
cess begins. In fact, a ban on secret settlements may lead publicity-
conscious defendants to settle earlier in the prefiling stages where no
ban applies.111 A substitution effect may thus occur whereby an in-
crease of prefiling settlements is accompanied by a decrease of postfil-
ing settlements. A rule of mandatory disclosure has two effects: (1) it
decreases the number of post-trial settlements while ensuring system-
atic information on these settlements; and (2) it increases the number
of private settlements prior to filing. If the second effect is strong, a
ban on secrecy is counterproductive because it reduces the overall
amount of information about settlements. 112 Important questions re-
main about the information benefits attained by shifting the focus
from postfiling to prefiling settlements. A recommendation on ban-
ning sealed settlements would require further empirical research into
108 See Miller, supra note 105, at 486; see also Stephen E. Darling, Confidential Settlements:
The Defense Perspective, 55 S.C. L. Rnv. 785, 786 (2004) ("[T]he potential clearly exists that
elimination of confidential settlements would promote unnecessary litigation without mak-
ing any more useful information available to the public.").
109 See generally Joseph F. Anderson Jr., Hidden from the Public by Order of the Court: The
Case Against Government-Enforced Secrecy, 55 S.C. L. REv. 711, 726 (2004) (finding that statis-
tics compiled since the implementation of Local Rule 5.03(c) easily refute the purported
"Deterrent to Settlements" argument); James E. Rooks Jr., Settlements and Secrets: Is the Sun-
shine Chilly?, 867-68 (2004) (citing a string of comments describing this chilling effect
when a district court judge solicited opinions about secret settlements from members of
the legal profession). United States district court judges in South Carolina "actually tried
two fewer cases in the twelve months following the promulgation of Local Rule 5.03(c),
than they did in the immediately preceding twelve-month period." Anderson, supra, at 726
(emphasis added). But cf Christopher R. Drahozal & LauraJ. Hines, Secret Settlement Restric-
tions and Unintended Consequences, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 1457, 1467-69 (2006) (emphasizing
the erratic decrease of the ratio of dispositions to filings in Florida, but concluding that
there are far too many confounding variables for the data to support the chilled-settle-
ments argument).
110 Overall then, the public interest in promoting settlements might outweigh the po-
tential cost of secrecy in settlements.
111 See generally Scott A. Moss, Illuminating Secrecy: A New Economic Analysis of Confidential
Settlements, 105 Micn. L. REV. 867, 880-910 (2007) (modeling the substitution effect that
results from mandatory disclosure rules).
112 See Drahozal & Hines, supra note 109, at 1483.
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the relative chilling and substitution effects of mandatory disclo-
sure, 113 as well as the type of information that remains hidden or that
is only selectively available after a ban on secrecy.
Still, in light of the feedback effect of settlements, a few major
differences appear between a world of secret settlement and one
where disclosure is mandatory. First, if the substitution effect to
prefiling settlements is strong, a ban on "court-approved" confidential
settlements will further reduce the availability of representative empir-
ical data on all settlements. In this sense, a ban on secret settlements
will likely augment the bias that the selective availability of settlement
information creates, as described in Part IV (e.g., emphasis on outli-
ers, strategic disclosures). Second, given the expected substitution
from post to pretrial settlements, a ban on secret settlements effec-
tively reduces the role of the judge as mediator in the negotiation
process. 114 This reduces the potential influence ofjudges as informa-
tion pools in settlement discussions and enforcers of customs and
norms derived from settlement practices, as discussed in Part II above.
CONCLUSION
Commentators generally assume that private settlements present
civil justice issues because of the presumed low visibility of such settle-
ments. To the contrary, this Essay identifies problematic issues involv-
ing the high visibility of certain nonrepresentative settlements.
Information on private settlement agreements circulates more widely
if the terms of the agreement are beyond the shadow of the law:
media reports focus on outlier cases; lawyers' networks and profes-
sional interest organizations circulate information on spectacular set-
tlements; and special interest groups bring attention to extravagant
settlements that are most likely to induce legislative counteraction.
Although information on settlements is more extensively distrib-
uted than generally assumed, the quality and scope of such informa-
tion is often dubious. Public records and settlement reporters contain
relevant information on public settlements, but are mostly limited to
certain topics or jurisdictions where publicity is customary or man-
dated. Informal access to confidential settlements is subject to the
control and (ab)use of those involved in negotiations. This in-
troduces a potential bias in the information that is available from the
larger pool of settlements.
113 There is much to be gained from comparing data on the amount of dispositions
and filings in states before and after the enactment of mandatory disclosure statutes.
114 This outcome should satisfy critics of managerial judging but frustrate those who
advocate the involvement of ajudge as an impartial mediator who can balance the unequal
bargaining power among litigants.
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As a result of prior settlement concessions, it becomes harder for
similarly situated defendants to contest similar claims because the pre-
cedent reduces the perceived unreasonableness of the novel claim. As
it becomes more difficult to withstand prior settlements, the selective
availability of individual concessions creates a ratchet effect, leading
settlements and judicial decisions further in the direction set by prior
concessions. These settlement dynamics provide a novel inroad for
possible research on the evolution of remedies and damages in vari-
ous areas of law.
To illustrate the feedback of settlements, the examples in this Es-
say have focused mostly on plaintiff's lawyers' potential selective use of
information on outlier settlements in order to obtain increasing
awards and to create novel remedies in tort disputes. It is important
to note, however, that the overall direction of the settlement feedback
on awards is ambiguous. This Essay does not suggest that the feed-
back effect of settlement works to the exclusive benefit of claimants
and trail lawyers. To the contrary, in concentrated industries where
tort settlements are handled by a few select lawyers or defense firms,
for instance, it is to be expected that selective use will be made of
information on settlements that are below the going rate at trial,
which might eventually enable defendants to drive down legally availa-
ble awards over time. The strength and direction of the settlement's
feedback effect will likely vary between areas of disputes, depending
on the involvement, coordination, and power dynamics between, on
the one hand, the plaintiff bar, and, on the other hand, long-run
stakeholders on the defense side.
Public regulation of the supply of information of settlements-
such as mandatory disclosure, sunshine legislation, court oversight,
and mandatory mediation procedures-could reduce the distorting
effect of selective settlement information. However, if restrictions on
confidentiality lead publicity-conscious defendants to settle in the
prefiling stages, court oversight will be affected, further reducing the
availability of transparent, publicly available information on
settlements.
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